PERFECT research
Books
Bortolotti, L. (2020). The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
Puddifoot, K. (2021). How Stereotypes Deceive Us. Oxford University Press.
Bortolotti, L. (2018) (ed.). Delusions in Context. Palgrave Pivot (open access).
PhD theses
Motta, V. (2021). Being Present in Times of Absence: A Philosophical and Empirical Enquiry on Loneliness and Solitude. University of Birmingham.
Antrobus, M. (2018). Epistemic and Psychological Benefits of Depression. University of Birmingham.
Policy brief
Mental Capacity Assessments, 26th March 2020
Special issues
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (eds.) (2017). False but Useful Beliefs. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1).
Stammers, S. and L. Bortolotti (eds.) (2020). Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation. Topoi 39 (1).
Journal articles
Motta, V. (2023). Loneliness: From Absence of Other to Disruption of Self. Topoi 42, 1143–1153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09984-5
Motta, V. and Larkin, M. (2023). Absence of other and disruption of self: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of the meaning of loneliness in the context of life in a religious community. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22, 55-80.
Motta, V. (2021). Key Concepts: Loneliness. Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology 28 (1): 71-81.
Motta, V. and Bortolotti, L. (2020). Solitude as a positive experience: empowerment and agency. Metodo 8 (2): 119-147.
Stammers, S. and Pulvermacher, R. (2020). The value of doing philosophy in mental health contexts. Journal of Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23: 743–752.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2020). Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation. Philosophical Psychology 33 (5): 679-704.
Stammers, S. (2020). Confabulation, explanation, and the pursuit of resonant meaning. Topoi 39 (1): 177-187
Gunn, R. and Larkin, M. (2020). Delusion Formation as an Inevitable Consequence of a Radical Alteration in Lived Experience. Psychosis 12 (2): 151-161.
Puddifoot, K. (2019). Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry 26 (4): 333-348.
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2019). Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance? Synthese.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. and Noordhof, P. (2020). The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief. Philosophical Studies 177: 1213–1227.
Lancellotta, E. and Bortolotti, L. (2019). Are clinical delusions adaptive? WIREs in Cognitive Science 10 (5): e1502.
Puddifoot, K. (2019). Stereotyping Patients. Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (1): 69-90.
Stammers, S. (2019). Improving knowledge acquisition and dissemination through technical interventions on cognitive biases.Educational Theory 68 (6): 675-692.
Puddifoot, K. and O'Donnell, C. (2019). Human Memory and the Limits of Technology in Education. Educational Theory 68 (6): 643-655.
Boden, Z., Larkin, M. Iyer, M. (2019). Picturing ourselves in the world: Drawings, IPA and the Relational Mapping Interview.Qualitative Research in Psychology 16 (2): 218-236.
Larkin, M., Shaw, R., Flowers, P. (2019). Multi-perspectival designs and processes in interpretative phenomenological research. Qualitative Research in Psychology 16 (2): 182-198.
Miller Tate, A. (2019). Contributory injustice in psychiatry. Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (2): 97-100.
Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2019). Epistemic Innocence and the Production of False Memory Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 176 (3): 755–780.
Puddifoot, K. (2018). Re-evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation Effect and the Overcritical Juror. Episteme.
Broome, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Affective instability and paranoia. Discipline Filosofiche XXVIII (2): 123-136.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Biased by our imaginings. Mind & Language.
Jefferson, A. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Why (some) unrealistic optimism is permissible in patient decision making. American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9): 27-29.
Polonioli, A., Vega-Mendoza, M., Blankinship, B. and Carmel, D. (2018). Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice. Review of Philosophy and Psychology https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0414-3.
Bortolotti, L. (2018). Optimism, agency, and success. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3): 521–535.
Laakso, M. and Polonioli, A. (2018). Open access in ethics research: an analysis of open access availability and author self-archiving behaviour in light of journal copyright restrictions. Scientometrics 116 (1): 291–317.
Polonioli, A., Stammers, S. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). “Good” Biases: Does Doxastic Irrationality Benefit Individuals and Groups?Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'etranger 143 (3): 327-344.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Monothematic delusions. A case of innocence from experience. Philosophical Psychology 31 (6): 920-947.
Polonioli, A. (2018). A Blind Spot in Research on Foreign Language Effects in Judgment and Decision-Making. Frontiers in Psychology 13 (9): 227.
Gunn, R. and Bortolotti, L. (2018). Can delusions play a protective role?Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4): 813-833.
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett (2018). Epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions. Mind & Language 33 (3): 263-279.
Bortolotti, L. (2018). Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2): 227-249.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2018). Explaining doxastic transparency: Aim, norm, or function?Synthese 195 (8): 3453-3476.
Polonioli, A. (2017). A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy. Synthese.
Stammers, S. (2017). A patchier picture still: biases, beliefs and overlap on the inferential continuum. Philosophia 45 (4): 1829–1850.
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?Philosophical Explorations 20: sup1: 1-3.
Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The multifactorial view. Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 137-156.
Larkin, M., Boden, Z., Newton, E. (2017). If Psychosis were cancer: A speculative comparison. BMJ Medical Humanities 43: 118-123 (Special issue on Communicating Mental Health).
Stoneham, T. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Another failed refutation of scepticism. Teorema XXXVI (2): 19-30.
Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias. Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 73-93.
Sullivan-Bissett (2017). Biological function and epistemic normativity.Philosophical Explorations 20 (S1): 94-110.
Jefferson, A., Bortolotti, L. and Kuzmanovic, B. (2017). What is unrealistic optimism?Consciousness & Cognition 50: 3–11.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Aims and exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 721-731.
Antrobus, M. and Bortolotti, L. (2016). Depressive delusions. Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201.
Polonioli, A. (2017). New issues for new methods: Ethical and editorial challenges for an experimental philosophy. Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4): 1009–1034.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Malfunction defended. Synthese 194 (7): 2501-2522.
Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2016). The ethics of delusional belief. Erkenntnis 81 (2): 275-296.
Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent work on the nature and development of delusions. Philosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645.
Bortolotti, L. and Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198.
In the pictures above you can see: Eugenia Lancellotta presenting her work on delusions, Magdalena Antrobus presenting her work on the benefits of depression, and Valeria Motta and Lisa Bortolotti at the York Mediale festival just before their presentation on loneliness and solitude.
Book chapters
Vintiadis, E. and Bortolotti, L. (2022). The role of context in belief evaluation. In J Musolino et al. (eds.) The Science of Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Polonioli A. and Bortolotti, L. (2021). The Social and Epistemic Benefits of Polite Conversations. In Chaoqun Xie (ed.) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Springer, 55-71.
Bortolotti, L. and Aliffi, M. (2021). The epistemic benefits of irrational boredom. In A Elpidorou (ed.) The Moral Psychology of Boredom. Rowman & Littlefield.
Bortolotti, L. and Stammers, S. (2020). Philosophy as a means of empowerment. In E Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. Routledge, ch. 1.
Bongiorno, F. and Bortolotti, L. (2020). The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation. In T. Chan and A. Nes (eds.) Inference and Consciousness. Routledge, ch. 3.
Bortolotti, L., Antrobus, M. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2019). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press, ch. 12.
Holroyd, J. and Puddifoot, K. (2019). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. Fricker, P.J. Graham, D. Henderson, and N. Pedersen (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge, ch. 30.
Bortolotti, L. and Puddifoot, K. (2019). Philosophy, Bias and Stigma. In D. Bubbio and J. Malpas (eds.) Why Philosophy. De Gruyter.
Bortolotti, L. (2018). Agency without Rationality. In A. Coliva, P. Leonardi, and S. Moruzzi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis, and History. Palgrave MacMillan, 265-280.
Puddifoot, K. (2018). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Discrimination. Routledge, ch. 4.
Bortolotti, L. (2018). Delusion and the Three Myths of Irrational Belief. In L. Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context. Palgrave, ch. 4.
Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L. (2017). Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief: Reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, ch. 9.
Sullivan-Bissett, E., Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.R. and Mameli, M. (2016). Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. In G. Keil, L. Keuck and R. Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, ch. 10.
Bortolotti, L., Gunn, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). What Makes a Belief Delusional? In I. Mac Carthy, K. Sellevold and O. Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda, ch. 3.
Other relevant publications
Wareham, R. J. (2019). Indoctrination, delusion and the possibility of epistemic innocence. Theory and Research in Education, 17(1), 40–61.
Metzinger, T. (2018). Why is Mind Wandering Interesting for Philosophers? In Kieran C.R. Fox & Kalina Christoff (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought: Mind - wandering, Creativity, Dreaming, and Clinical Conditions. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bortolotti, L. and Gunn, R. (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2016). The Role of Emotions and Values in Competence. Journal of Medical Ethics. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103315
Fineberg, S. and Corlett, P. (2016). The Doxastic Shear-pin: Delusions as Errors of Learning and Memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 21 (1): 73-89.
Letheby, C. (2016). The Epistemic Innocence of Psychedelic States. Consciousness & Cognition 39: 28-37.
Bortolotti, L. (2016). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in Schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 879-900.
Miyazono, K. and Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions. Avant V (3): 30-50.
Bortolotti, L. and Miyazono, K. (2015). Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs? (Commentary on Transparent Minds). Teorema 34 (1): 135-148.
Bortolotti, L. (2015). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 490-99.
Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2015). Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. Consciousness & Cognition 33: 548-60.
Fulford, W., Bortolotti, L. and Broome, M. (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2): 110-117.
Craigie, J. and Bortolotti, L. (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J. Sadler et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Posters by doctoral researchers and research assistants
